Food Issues of Iraq

Under the UN’s Oil-for-Food program, known as 986 after the UN resolution creating it, the whole population of Iraq is supposed to receive rations on a monthly basis.  The system is generally effective, though some people such as the internally displaced people are excluded.  Everyone is mandated to receive their ration whether they need it or not.  This is part of the Iraqi regimes’ system of control, as by showing up for rations the authorities certify that the family is still in place.  A table illustrating current rations follows this article.

In the areas under the control of the two Kurdish authorities (PUK and KDP), the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) is responsible for food distribution.  The system has worked reasonably well though persistent complaints have been heard about newly displaced persons lacking their ration card not being able to access the distribution and second that the quality of food distributed is often poor.  A key weakness of the WFP distribution is its dependence on Baghdad for re-supply.  It is thought that the WFP is only able to keep a few weeks supply on hand in the North.  The re-supply comes from warehouses under the control of Baghdad, in Kirkuk and Mosul.  This is part of the strategy used by Baghdad over the years to tightly control the UN program in the North.  In the event of war, it could be expected that WFP food re-supply from the south would be disrupted. 

-         Determine exact location of 986 warehouses in Kirkuk and Mosul and current stock levels.

-         Early in a conflict secure these warehouses, the delivery vehicles and warehouse contents, though distribution of the contents may be altered should there be large scale population movements (i.e. IDPs back to Kirkuk or Arabs fleeing Kirkuk.)

Outside of the 986 distribution in the North, the food situation is considered to be good.  There was a good harvest in 2002, estimated by Kurdish officials to be in the range of 500,000 tonnes, roughly equivalent to the amount brought in under the 986 program annually.  Due to Baghdad’s refusal to buy from the North, there is no market for the grain.  While this has resulted in poor revenue for the farmers it has resulted in very cheap food for the general population.  Anecdotal evidence shows that most families in the North have built up a reserve of food in their homes sufficient to last them from 3 weeks to 3 months. 

Points to Consider:

-         Track market prices of key commodities in northern cities.

-         If people are forced to flee their homes they will probably not be able to take their complete reserve with them.

-         Many people, particularly in the urban environment, are dependant on electricity sources in order to cook food/bake bread. 

In the event of large scale population movements during a war (expulsions from Kirkuk/Mosul/Baghdad of non-Arabs, or flight from the northern cities due to attacks or fear of potential attacks by WMD) many people will go to friends or family in villages and small towns.  Many of these villages did not exist in 1991 (having been destroyed by the regime over the previous 20 years), hence people ended up crossing into Iran or being pent up in the mountains along the Turkish border. 

Points to consider:

-         Aggressive action by the Iraqi regime that is sufficient to generate large scale displacement must be met promptly and visibly by US military response.  This is the only action that will limit a humanitarian crisis in the North. 

-         Should there be pockets of displacement; the WFP staff remaining in place (national staff) should be encouraged to work with the local authorities in distributing existing stocks. 

-         Reserves held by the Kurdish authorities need to be identified. 

-         The road system in the North connecting the major cities and many minor roads are in very good shape.  However, the state of road clearance capacity for the winter months is unknown.  Should there be a displacement into rough terrain the only option may be the allocation of US military assets for their lift capacity.

-         Chem-bio contamination of stocks could occur or could be rumored to have occurred.

The Center/South

In the areas under the control of the Iraqi government, the distribution of the food rations is done by the Ministry of Trade of the Iraqi government.  The UN is limited to an observation role.  The Iraqi government contracts with foreign suppliers for the supply and delivery of food commodities.  Key suppliers of wheat and rice include Australia, Thailand and Vietnam.  The deliveries are largely made by ship to Umm Qasr (a port at the head of the Gulf.)  Some shipments come in by road via the Jordanian port of Aqaba.  The bulk commodities are sent on to regional warehouses in the main storage complexes of the Ministry of Trade in each governorate, and eventually to the 45,864 distribution points country wide, largely neighborhood shops which have been given the monopoly on distribution locally.  People pay a nominal fee, the equivalent of less than a dollar a month to the shop keepers to cover some of the expenses.  The grain is normally milled in country.  There are a few international NGOs operating in the Center/South.  However, they have been very constrained in their activities by the Iraqi government and have no significant capacity to act as replacements for the current distribution system. 

In the event of a war this system could be expected to be disrupted while a new authority is put in place either country wide or at least initially regionally.

Points to Consider:

-         The ration distribution system is run by the Iraqi government not the UN agencies.  Unlike Afghanistan, there is no network of international agency infrastructure inside the Center/South. 

-         Nearly 20 million people receive rations on a monthly basis from this government run system.  There is no data on how many of these people are critically dependant on monthly distributions. Ten percent is a conservative figure and the number could be much higher.

-         The ration system works every day, that is, not everybody receives their ration on the same day of the month.  This means that from day one of a conflict approx 4% of the population will be due their ration, (based on 25 days of distribution per month) i.e just fewer than 1 million people.  If 10% of these people are critically dependent, 100,000 people will be in trouble on day one, and the number could rise by 100,000 each day.

-         There are several factors that would mitigate the problem;

o       The level of reserves in homes may be similar to the North in that food is cheap however the economy is worse in Center/South and more people could be expected to be in desperate shape than in the North. 

o       According to press accounts an extra four months of rations has been distributed

o       There are stocks in country, both 986 and Iraqi strategic reserves. 

Necessary assumptions and actions

Assumption 1: There is no alternative in Center/South to the existing ration distribution system.  The objective of any new authority must be to disrupt this structure as little as possible and re-start it as quickly as possible. 

Action: Gather all available hard info on the distribution system; warehouses, stocks, vehicles, distribution points, and key personnel (names and addresses.)

Assumption 2:  At least ten percent of the population will be critically dependent on their monthly ration distribution.

Action:  It doesn’t matter.  The neediest are not located in one place but dispersed throughout the population and there is no database of who they are.  Hence in order to cover the most needy, general distribution will need to occur. 

Assumption 3:  Within the United Nations, the WFP is the most knowledgeable agency on the distribution of food inside Iraq.  They are a key interlocutor for planning and the only international option for taking over the running of the general food distribution network.

Action: Dialogue needs to begin between CentCom and WFP, either directly (difficult due to UN constraints) or through third parties, UNJLC, USAID or NGOs.

Assumption 4: In the aftermath of military action, there will be new authorities.  This may occur piecemeal or all at once. 

Action: US military should identify the coordinates of key food distribution infrastructure and physically secure these points at the earliest opportunity.  Analysis of the Iraqi distribution hierarchy should begin now in order to determine which personnel must be replaced.  The rest of the personnel down to shopkeeper should be retained.

Assumption 5:  There are three alternatives for re-starting the general distribution system.  The US military can manage the process, an officer can be appointed to fill the chair of the Minister of Trade and all necessary levels below it.  WFP can be encouraged to take on this role.  A trusted Iraqi can be put into this position along with people of his choosing.  Even if the first option is taken, one of the latter two will become a medium term solution.

Action: Assess options and repercussions and have plan in place before initiation of hostilities. 

Assumption 6: In country stocks, 986 and strategic reserve is unmilled. The mills rely upon some energy source.

Action: Identify the existing mills, their energy source and other necessary inputs to re-start production.

Assumption 7: General distribution of food rations is not desirable over the long term.  Stability in Iraq involves returning to a market based distribution of food rather than aid dependency.  However there are some people that may always need food assistance.

Action: Either the UN agencies (WFP/FAO) or the new Iraqi leadership should prepare a timeline that balances, reduction of imports, agricultural seasons, re-start internal grain markets, identification of most needy for targeted distribution.

Iraqi population by governorate covered by UN Resolution 986.

 

Governorate               Population                      Adults    Children under 1 yr.

Ninevah                        2486466                       2420618            65848

Tameem (Kirkuk)           869246                         847543            21703

Baghdad                       6408160                       6237927          170233

Salah Al-Din                   961577                         934910            26667

Diala                            1254391                       1222654            31737

Anbar                           1254241                       1217588            36653

Babylon                        1390695                       1356046            34649

Kerbala                          733121                         714023            19098

Najaf                              940966                         913831            27135

Qadisiya                         904455                         880329            24126

Muthana                         549259                         533178            16081

Basrah                          1954698                       1895456            59242

Maysan                          836639                         805908            30731

Thi-Qar                        1519490                       1473383            46107

Wasit                             927166                         903606            23560

Dahuk                            807005                         788759            18246

Erbil                             1316162                      1292770            23392

Sulaymaniyah                1584683                      1561612            23071

Total                          26698420                     26000141          698279

 

 

Phase XII Monthly ration

 

Wheat flour                                          9.0kg

Rice                                                     3.0kg

Sugar                                                   2.0kg

Tea                                                      0.2kg

Cooking oil                                           1.5kg

Milk powder                                        3.6kg

Dried whole milk and / or Cheese         1.0kg

Fortified weaning cereal                        0.8kg

Pulses                                                   1.5kg

Iodized Salt                                          0.15kg

Soaps and detergents soap                   0.25kg

Detergents                                            0.5 kg